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The US-OCTG panel decision concerned the latest in a long line of antidumping (AD) disputes about 
Oil Country Tubular Goods. It was notable for a broadly permissive approach by the panel; on all major 
legal issues but one, the panel sided with the United States over Korean objections. The case itself was 
also notable for the U.S. reversal of a negative preliminary determination, something that had occurred 
in fewer than 1 percent of prior cases. Finally, the case was notable for unusual behavior outside of the 
investigative process, including both vocal political complaints and a curious decision by Korea not to 
appeal. We discuss the legal determinations made by the panel and offer a new interpretation of how to 
think about whether AD practices are justifiable. We also describe the broader diplomatic context in 
which Korea and the United States interacted and consider the implications if political pressures play an 
increased role in determining dispute outcomes. 
Keywords 




The reader might be forgiven for thinking, “Oh no, not another AD decision.” Or even, “Oh no, not 
another Oil Country Tubular Goods decision,” given how many there have been over the years. But 
there were a number of distinctive, intriguing features of the US-OCTG ruling and the behavior 
surrounding it. These features speak to important issues such as the proper connection between permitted 
AD behavior and sound economic policy; the appropriate level of interaction between politics and 
dispute settlement proceedings; and even the types of uncertainty introduced when political pressures 
threaten to overwhelm conventional legal practices.  
On its face, the decision simply looked like a resounding defeat for Korea. It had complained about 
numerous U.S. procedures used to assess AD duties on its industries and it ended up losing all significant 
legal rulings but one. Further, the decision looked like a defeat for those hoping to push AD policies in 
a more economically-justifiable direction. Often the panel reasoning focused instead on what was 
expressly permitted or forbidden by the AD agreement.  
The issues surrounding the case are more novel and interesting. There was a rare reversal of a 
preliminary negative determination. There was extensive political involvement in the United States. The 
arguments were occurring against a backdrop of diplomatic contention between the United States and 
Korea, in which the United States had threatened to withdraw from the trade agreement between them 
(KORUS). And there was the rare failure of Korea to appeal the ruling. 
Section 2 provides some factual background about the OCTG industry, the GATT and WTO disputes 
involving it, and its role as the focus of AD efforts. Section 3 details the legal arguments raised in the 
case and the panel findings on each. Section 4 describes some of the broader economic concerns raised 
by the case. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Factual background for OCTG industry  
Oil country tubular goods (OCTG) are steel pipes used for oil and natural gas extraction. OCTG typically 
covers drill pipe, casing and tubing whose specifications are stipulated by the American Petroleum 
Institute. Drill pipe is hollow steel piping that is used on drilling rigs. Casing is usually installed in rigs 
to prevent water or soil from entering to extraction process. Tubing transports the oil and gas from well 
to the on ground floor.  
  
                                                     
* We are very grateful to the constructive comments by Chad Bown, Meredith Crowley, Robert Howse, Petros Mavroidis, 
Arevik Gnutzmann- Mkrtchyan, Douglas Nelson, and Thomas Prusa. This research has been greatly benefitted by excellent 
research assistance of Kyunghwa Kim and Hyerim Kim. These views are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the position of Flexport. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of a deep well completion 
 
Source: <https://www.imoa.info/molybdenum-uses/molybdenum-grade-alloy-steels-irons/oil-
country-tubular-goods.php > (visited 2 March 2019) 
 
 
Demand for OCTG is driven typically by the levels of activity in oil and gas industries, whereas demand 
for standard pipe products is driven largely by construction activities. So, OCTG is a specialized and a 
higher-value-added product with complicated specifications, sold at a significant premium over other 
pipe or tubular products. Thus, exporting governments are often engaged in subsidy policies to promote 
exportation. In addition, most OCTG exporting countries that have advanced technology in terms of 
steel manufacturing do not have oil or gas drilling activities in their domestic territories. Due to the lack 
of domestic markets, antidumping cases involving OCTG typically use constructed values instead of 
normal values. It explains why OCTG is one of the most frequently targeted products by trade remedy 
measures that cover a wide range of steel products.1 As a consequence, trade measures dealing with 
OCTG have caused numerous WTO disputes, as shown in Table 1.2  
  
                                                     
1 For example, in the AD proceeding of US – OCTG, most of products under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States (“HTSUS”) item numbers 7304.29, 7304,39, 7304.59, 7305.20, 7305.31, 7306.29, 7306.30, 7306.50 are subject to 
the investigation.  
2 There are a number of analyses of OCTG-related WTO disputes. See e.g., Grossman and Mavroidis (2005), Bown and 
Wauters (2008), Grossman and Wauters (2008), Prusa and Vermulst (2013), Ahn and Zanardi (2017).  
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Table 1. WTO Disputes Involving OCTG, Tube or Pipe 
DS Number Dispute Title Complainant 
AD Case 
23 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of — Anti-Dumping Investigation in 
Respect of Imports of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) 
Mexico 
268 United States — Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country 
Tubular Goods from Argentina 
Argentina 
282 United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods 
(OCTG) from Mexico 
Mexico 
331 Mexico — Anti-Dumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala Guatemala 
346 United States — Anti-Dumping Administrative Review on Oil Country 
Tubular Goods from Argentina 
Argentina 
379* United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China 
China 
454 China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance 
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from Japan 
Japan 
460 China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance 
Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from the European Union 
European 
Union 
482 Canada — Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Carbon Steel 
Welded Pipe from The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu 
Chinese 
Taipei 
488 United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Oil Country Tubular 
Goods from Korea 
Korea 
530 Kazakhstan — Anti-dumping Measures on Steel Pipes Ukraine 
569 Armenia — Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Pipes Ukraine 
570 Kyrgyz Republic — Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Pipes Ukraine 
CVD Case 
379* United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China 
China 
437 United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from 
China 
China 




202 United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea 
Korea 




249** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
Japan 
251** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
Korea 
252** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
China 
253** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
Switzerland 
254** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
Norway 
258** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
New Zealand 
259** United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel 
Products 
Brazil 
Note: *DS379 involves both AD and CVD complaints. **DS248,249,251,252,253,254,258,259 are 
merged in one panel and Appellate Body proceeding. 
Dukgeun Ahn and Philip I. Levy 
4 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
As shown in Figure 1, in the US oil and gas industries during 2015-2016, there was a significant decrease 
in the number of rigs in use due to sudden drops in crude oil prices. Consequently, the dramatically 




Figure 1. Rigs Count in the US Oil and Natural Gas Industries 
 
[Data Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Drilling Productivity Report 2019, 
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/] 
In the underlying case of US – OCTG (Korea)3, the US Department of Commerce (DOC) imposed AD 
duties on OCTG imported from not just Korea but also eight other countries, including China, India, 
Turkey, Vietnam, Ukraine, Taiwan, Philippines, and Thailand.  
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5.24% 2.76% 6.75% 
19.40% 
(Preliminary) 







Apr. 19, 2010 (POI: Oct. 1, 2008 – 
Mar. 31, 2009): 29.94~99.14% 
Dec. 17, 2012 
(POR: May 19, 
2010 – Apr. 30, 
2011): 172.54% 
Rescission of 
the AR for 
2011-2012 
Rescission of 











Rescission of the 
AR for 2014-2015 
N/A N/A 
Turkey 0.00-4.87% 0.00~35.86% 
Rescission of the 







24.22% ~111.47% 0.00% N/A N/A 
Ukraine 5.31% 6.73% N/A N/A N/A 
Taiwan 0.00-2.65% 0.00~2.34% 0.00% N/A N/A 
Saudi 
Arabia 
2.92% de minimis (termination) N/A N/A N/A 
Philippines 8.90% 
9.88% (imports negligible  
investigation terminated) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Thailand 118.32% 
118.32% (imports negligible  
investigation terminated) 
N/A N/A N/A 
[source: 
https://www.usitc.gov/investigations/701731/2014/certain_oil_country_tubular_goods_india_kore
a/final.htm, and https://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/index.html ] 
* Note: AD rates revised pursuant to the CIT decision  
Oddly enough, the DOC issued a negative preliminary determination only for Korean exporters among 
the many OCTG exporters, despite Korea exhibiting the largest import share.6 But this preliminary result 
was reversed in the final determination as shown in Table 2. It is, in fact, very rare for the DOC to 
reverse the negative preliminary determination in the final determination. For 206 cases determined 
from January 2014 to April 2019, the DOC reversed only three cases, including the current OCTG case.7 
                                                     
4 Many of the AD rates were modified later due to ministerial errors and the Court of International Trade proceedings. 
5 This decision applied the “particular market situation” method that provoked another huge controversy on the legality of 
the DOC practices. The Korea  
6 79 Federal Register 10480 (25 February 2014). 
7 The other two cases involve Taiwanese steel exportation, steel nails (A-583-854) and corrosion-resistant steel products (A-
583-856). 
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Figure 2. OCTG Import of US (Value in $1,000) 
 
[Source: US Bureau of Census]  
 
The negative preliminary determination by the DOC seemed to instigate a very active political lobby by 
domestic producers despite somewhat weak evidence for dumping allegations.8 In the end, the DOC 
reversed its decision in the final determination, which raised many controversial issues. For example, 
there was the question of comparing Korean profits across markets. Since Korean producers did not 
normally sell OCTG in their domestic market, which never had any oil drilling activities, the profits in 
their home market sales or financial statements did not properly represent “the profit to reasonably 
reflect the merchandise under investigation.”. This led the DOC to calculate constructed value (CV) 
profits. To do so, the DOC considered the profit for Tenaris SA (Tenaris), an Argentinian global 
producer and seller of OCTG products. But, the Tenaris profit - 26.11 percent - information was 
dismissed in the preliminary determination due to a lack of accuracy, since it was based on “a research 
paper prepared by a student at the University of Iowa, School of Management.” 9  Instead, in the 
preliminary results, the DOC decided to use home market sales of non-OCTG pipe or the financial 
statements of the six Korean OCTG producers. The DOC, however, changed its decision in the final 
determination and adopted the Tenaris financial statements as the best available option for determining 
CV profit.  
                                                     
8 The DOC posted to the record a letter signed by 57 US Senators and a letter signed by 155 Members of the US House of 
Representatives on the U.S. industry’s behalf. US – OCTG, Panel Report, para.7.202. For an excellent account about the 
political pressure and lobbying for this OCTG case in particular and steel antidumping cases in general, see Ikenson (2014).  
9 US DOC, “Decision Memorandum for the Negative Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value” (14 
February 2014), 22. The DOC decision memo included the caveat as follows: “This report was created by a student enrolled 
in the Applied Securities Management (Henry Fund) program at the University of Iowa’s Tippie School of Management 
and contains several disclaimers. The intent of the report is to provide potential employers and other interested parties an 
example of the analytical skills, investment knowledge, and communication abilities of Henry Fund students. … The report 
is not a complete compilation of data, and its accuracy is not guaranteed. From time to time, the University of Iowa, its 
faculty, staff, students, or the Henry Fund may hold a financial interest in the companies mentioned in this report.” Id., 
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Moreover, the DOC limited its AD examination to only two producers, HYSCO and NEXTEEL, 
while excluding four voluntary respondents. But one of the excluded respondents, ILJIN, was the only 
supplier of seamless OCTG from Korea, making it distinctly different from the other Korean suppliers 
that only produced welded OCTG. Such a distinctive market role could presumably have led to lesser 
AD duties, the reason the producer voluntarily responded. Even US petitioners, in their comments on 
respondent selection, admitted that ILJIN should be selected as a mandatory respondent.10 
After the panel for the WTO dispute settlement procedure was established on 25 March 2015, the 
US Court of International Trade (CIT) issued the remand order on 2 September 2015.11 The CIT directed 
the DOC to reconsider certain aspects of the CV profit rate calculation as well as the issue of whether 
the only two selected respondents were representative of the Korean industry since it did not provide 
sufficient reasoning for declining to select ILJIN as a mandatory respondent.  
Pursuant to the CIT decision, on 22 February 2016, the DOC issued the redetermination result that 
lowered the dumping margins from 15.75% to 6.49% for HYSCO and from 9.89% to 3.98% for 
NEXTEEL.12 But the DOC continued not to select ILJIN as a mandatory respondent. Korea’s challenge 
on these remand decisions by the DOC was rejected by the panel that ruled the pertinent claims to fall 
outside its terms of reference.  
Although the panel issued rulings that agreed with Korea regarding only one legal issue, Korea 
decided not to appeal the panel ruling.13 Also the Korean government agreed with the US government 
on the 12 month implementation period - expiring on 12 January 2019, which seemed an unusually long 
period to reconsider only the CV profit element.14 This arrangement was further modified to extend the 
expiry date until 12 July 2019.15 Such a delay would normally be seen as severely disadvantaging Korea, 
the complaining country. As a compliance action, the DOC commenced a Section 129 proceeding on 7 
November 2018.16 On 8 August 2019, the US government referred this case to Article 22.6 arbitration 
after the Korean government requested the retaliation authorization of $350 million.17 
3. Key legal rulings 
While Korea raised about ten legal claims, the panel ruled in favor of Korea only on CV profit 
determination. For other claims, the panel approved a notably broad scope of the investigating 
authority’s discretion. We will focus on two core legal issues: whether the DOC was justified in its 
decision (i) to use CV profit based on the controversial study result and (ii) to decline the examination 
of voluntary respondents. 
                                                     
10 US DOC, “Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Determination in the Less Than Fair Value 
Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea” (10 July 2014), 102. 
11 US Court of International Trade, Husteel Co. Ltd., Nexteel Co. Ltd., and Hyundai Hysco v. United States, Slip Op. 15-100 
(2 September 2015) (hereinafter US CIT (2015)). 
12 US DOC, “Final Determination Pursuant to Court Remand”, <https://enforcement.trade.gov/remands/15-100.pdf>; See 
also 81 Federal Register 59603 (30 August 2016). 
13 The decision was adopted on 12 January 2018. Since the Korean companies wanted a faster resolution of the dispute, they 
decided not to initiate the Appellate Body (AB) procedure due to the concern on too much delay caused by the lack of the 
AB Members.  
14 WTO, WT/DS488/11 (dated 27 February 2018). On the other hand, the Korea-US (KORUS) FTA renegotiation began on 
5 January 2018. Although there was no formal recognition by the Korean government on any relationship between the 
KORUS FTA and this dispute, the pressures by the US government was quite substantial even with the announcement by 
the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to repeal the FTA.  
15 WTO, WT/DS488/13 (dated 14 January 2019). 
16 83 Federal Register 59359 (23 November 2018). 
17 WTO, WT/DS488/14 (dated 30 July 2019) and WT/DS488/15 (dated 9 August 2019). 
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3.1 Viability Test 
Korea challenged the DOC decision to use CV instead of accepting third-country export prices. So it 
contested the legality of the US AD rule that allowed such discretion for the DOC. The “viability test” 
or “minimum quantitative threshold” set out in 19 U.S.C. §1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii) provides that third-country 
export sales of the foreign like product can be used for determining normal value if such sales are more 
than 5% of the quantity or value of sales in the US market.  
On the other hand, AD Agreement Article 2.2 allows dumping margin calculations using export 
prices from an appropriate third country when there are no or low volumes sales of the like product in 
the ordinary course of trade in the exporting country market. The footnote of Article 2.2 further explains 
that an export volume shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the 
normal value if such export constitutes more than 5 per cent of the sales in the importing country.  
First, Korea argued that, unlike the “viability test,” Article 2.2 does not stipulate an investigating 
authority to use third-country export sales for the normal value calculation only when such a minimum 
quantitative threshold is met. Korea claimed that “the existence of such a threshold” itself was an 
additional requirement not contemplated in the AD Agreement and rendered the “viability test” as such 
inconsistent with Article 2.2.  
The panel explained that while Article 2.2 permits the authority to have a choice between third-
country export prices and the constructed normal value for purposes of normal value determination, 
Article 2.2 “neither expressly limits nor directs” how to reach that choice. Thus it ruled that an 
investigating authority has the complete discretion to choose which method to use based on its own 
criteria. Moreover, the panel added that Article 2.2 does not require the authority to explain the basis of 
the choice between the two methods. As a result, the panel concluded that the 5% threshold as a criterion 
for third-country sales in US law is not inconsistent as such with Article 2.2 of the AD Agreement. 
Second, Korea claimed that the viability test is inconsistent with Article 2.2 as applied in the OCTG 
investigation. Based on a rigid application of the viability test, the DOC’s questionnaire deprived Korean 
respondents of even the opportunity to submit third-country sales data or describe their third-country 
market sales. In other words, the DOC automatically excluded from consideration the Korean 
respondents’ third-country market sales that did not meet the 5% threshold without any regard to 
whether the prices of these sales were representative in accordance with Article 2.2. 
The panel ruled that Article 2.2 does not impose any obligation on an investigating authority to 
examine whether a respondent’s third-country export prices are representative if it chose to use 
constructed normal value. The panel therefore concluded that the DOC did not act inconsistently with 
Article 2.2 in applying the viability test and thus rejecting third-country sales for determining normal 
value.  
Therefore, the panel concluded that the “viability test” adopted by the DOC is not inconsistent with 
AD Agreement Article 2.2, either “as such”, or “as applied”. 
3.2 Constructed Value Profit Rate Determination  
(1) Duty To Use Actual Data under the Article 2.2.2  
When the DOC reversed its own decision in the preliminary determination and decided to use the 
controversial profit information of Tenaris (26.11%) for CV calculation, Korea argued that the DOC 
should use at least the actual data, as stipulated in Article 2.2.2 of the AD Agreement. Article 2.2.2 
requires price construction to be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary 
course of trade of the like product. If that is not possible, price construction may be based on: (i) the 
actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter in respect of production and sales in the domestic 
market of the country of origin of the same general category of products; (ii) the weighted average of 
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the actual amounts incurred and realized by other exporters subject to investigation in respect of 
production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of origin; (iii) any other 
reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established shall not exceed the profit 
normally realized by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category in 
the domestic market of the country of origin.  
Korea argued that the DOC violated Article 2.2.2 since it did not use actual data for Korean exporters’ 
profits on home market as well as third-country sales of the like product. The United States rebutted that 
neither of the two Korean respondents had a viable home or third-country market during the period of 
investigation. 
The panel addressed the following three specific issues in a sequence: 
1) whether the DOC was permitted to reject the actual data concerning the Korean respondents’ 
domestic market sales of the like product during the period of investigation, because these sales 
were made in “low volumes”; 
2) if not, whether the DOC had actual profit data concerning the respondents’ domestic market 
sales of the like product; and 
3) whether the investigating authority need not consider the data concerning the losses, even if 
“actual”, when an exporter makes a loss rather than a profit on domestic sales of the like product. 
First, the panel clarified the existing jurisprudence that the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 did not allow an 
investigating authority to decline the actual data concerning the respondents’ domestic market sales 
simply because these sales were made in low volumes. The Appellate Body in EC – Tube or Pipe 
Fittings explained that the absence of any qualifying language related to low volumes in Article 2.2.2 
implies no exception for low-volume sales.18 The panel in EC – Salmon (Norway) also confirmed that 
an investigating authority must include data pertaining to low-volume sales when determining the 
amounts for profit under the chapeau of Article 2.2.2.19 Therefore, the panel concluded that the chapeau 
of Article 2.2.2 did not permit the DOC to reject the actual data pertaining to the Korean respondents’ 
domestic market sales. 
This decision raised an interesting point for Article 2.2. As the United States argued, it seems 
puzzling that, while low-volume sales in the domestic market are rejected as a basis for normal value 
determination in the chapeau of Article 2.2, data derived from the same sales should be accepted for 
purposes of CV profit determination under Article 2.2.2. The panel agreed that, in terms of overall 
coherence of Article 2, this is “somewhat perplexing.”20 But the panel explained that the identification 
of low-volume sales permits an investigating authority to either construct normal value or use third-
country export prices as normal value. That is, the identification of low-volume sales operates as a 
trigger for an investigating authority to adopt an alternative measure for normal value determination. 
That, however, does not necessarily exclude the components of such low-volume sale price from that 
determination. Moreover, Article 2.2.2 requires that only sales “in the ordinary course of trade” be used 
as a basis for CV profit determination. Accordingly, “what is discarded for normal value determination 
under Article 2.2 is the price of low-volume sales”, but “what is accepted for purposes of normal value 
construction under Article 2.2.2 is the amount for profit and SG&A on those low-volume sales that are 
in the ordinary course of trade.”21 Therefore, it explained that the exclusion of sales that are not in the 
ordinary course of trade would, “at least in part,” address the overall coherence issue.22 
                                                     
18 The Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings 
from Brazil (EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings) (DS219), para.98. 
19 The Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC – Salmon 
(Norway)) (DS337), para.7.297. 
20 US – OCTG (Korea), panel report, para.7.44. 
21 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.45. 
22 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.46. 
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Second, the panel noted that neither the DOC’s final determination nor its preliminary determination 
made any reference to the alleged lack of relevant data as a reason for the CV profit determination. To 
the contrary, the respondents, HYSCO and NEXTEEL, clearly stated that they had made “some sales of 
the foreign like product in the home market during the POI.” Thus, the panel dismissed as ex post 
rationalization the U.S. argument that the DOC could not use the preferred method to determine CV 
profit because the record did not contain any data pertaining to sales of the like product in the home 
market. 
Lastly, the panel ruled that nothing in the DOC’s determinations indicates its decision to reject the 
Korean respondents’ actual data due to the loss during the POI. The United States has not identified 
where, in its determination, the DOC relied on this conclusion as a reason for not using the preferred 
method to calculate CV profit. Therefore, the panel rejected this justification offered by the United States 
as ex post rationalization as well. 
(2) "Same General Category of Products" under Articles 2.2.2(i) and 2.2.2(iii) 
For a profit determination under Article 2.2.2(i) or to calculate a profit cap under Article 2.2.2(iii), an 
investigating authority must determine the scope of the “same general category of products”. Korea 
argued that the DOC applied the term “same general category of products” in Article 2.2.2 too narrowly 
to consider non-OCTG products, such as line pipe and standard pipe, as falling within the “same general 
category” as OCTG. It claimed that, due to this excessively narrow interpretation, the DOC rejected 
Articles 2.2.2(i) and 2.2.2(iii) as a basis to calculate CV profit. Korea claimed that a like product, based 
on the DOC’s definition of the foreign like product, could be excluded from the same general category 
of products.  
While the panel noted that there is no precise definition of the term “same general category of 
products” in Article 2.2.2(i) or (iii), it explained that “the scope of the same general category of products 
must be understood to be broader, not narrower than that of the like product.”23 Therefore, if the like 
product is not limited to pipe products used for down hole applications, the same general category of 
products, which is broader than the like product, cannot be limited to pipe products used for down hole 
applications. In other words, the same general category of products cannot exclude pipe products that 
do not exhibit the same fundamental characteristics for down hole applications and are not used for 
down hole applications. Yet, the DOC excluded such products from the same general category of 
products in the underlying investigation. The panel therefore concluded that the DOC defined the same 
general category of products more narrowly than it defined the like product by excluding those pipe 
products not used for down hole applications that fell within the definition of the like product. Thus, the 
DOC had no proper basis for its conclusions that the methods under Article 2.2.2(i) could not be used, 
and that the profit cap called for in Article 2.2.2(iii) could not be calculated. 
Accordingly, the panel ruled that the DOC’s decision to adopt the CV profit based on Tenaris 
information is inconsistent with Article 2.2.2. This is the only core legal issue for which the panel found 
in favor of Korea.  
3.3 “Association” and Construction of Export Price  
Korea argued that the DOC’s calculation of constructed export prices was inconsistent with Article 2.3 
due to the wrongful association determination between NEXTEEL and POSCO. Korea further argued 
that even where association existed, the DOC had to determine whether the export price was actually 
unreliable because of such association, but the DOC failed to make such a determination. 
                                                     
23 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.66. 
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Pursuant to Article 2.3, when an investigating authority considers that the export price is unreliable 
because of association between the exporter and the importer, the export price may be constructed on 
the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the 
products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on such 
reasonable basis as the authority may determine.  
While the panel clarified that the appearance of unreliability must be because of association, it 
explained that the text of Article 2.3 does not require any determination, let alone a determination as to 
the reliability of the export price. On the other hand, it also explained that Article 2.3 does not allow 
construction of export price simply because of association. An investigating authority should not ignore 
evidence suggesting that the export price may be reliable notwithstanding association. Moreover, 
“association” may be shown by “formal legal ties or far less structured and non-binding relationships”.24 
It ruled that “association” exists “where an exporter and the importer or a third party do not act 
independently of one another”.25  
The DOC found “association” on the basis of the intermediate factual findings, including: 
 POSCO supplied NEXTEEL with “virtually all” of the steel coil, the main input used in the 
production of OCTG, used by NEXTEEL 
 POSCO had a history of working closely on-site with NEXTEEL departments and providing 
marketing assistance and other promotional activities for the benefit of NEXTEEL 
 POSCO and NEXTEEL shared technology and market information pertaining to OCTG. 
Based on these findings, the DOC concluded that the combination of POSCO’s involvement on both the 
production and sales side creates a unique situation where POSCO is operationally in a position to 
exercise restraint or direction over NEXTEEL in a manner that affects the pricing, production, and sale 
of OCTG.  
Korea rebutted that the DOC ignored alternative explanations of the evidence as well as other 
evidence which undermined these findings. For example, the DOC failed to consider that NEXTEEL 
had alternative sources other than POSCO from which it purchased steel coils. It also argued that the 
DOC failed to consider evidence regarding marketing and technology collaboration between NEXTEEL 
and POSCO that undermined its findings 
Regarding the determination of “association” between NEXTEEL and POSCO, the panel found that 
Korea failed to demonstrate that the evidence relied on by the DOC did not support its intermediate 
factual findings. The DOC’s intermediate findings concerning NEXTEEL’s purchases and consumption 
of steel coils, marketing and technology collaboration between POSCO and NEXTEEL, and sales in the 
US market through “associated” companies were found to be sufficient to demonstrate “association” 
between the exporter and the importer or a third party within the meaning of Article 2.3.  
3.4 Disclosure of Essential Information and Communication 
The DOC only revealed in its final determination that it had accepted the Tenaris profit data for purposes 
of CV profit calculation. The DOC was similarly coy about political arguments that had been made for 
rethinking the preliminary determination. On 17 June 2014, one day before the deadline to submit case 
briefs, the DOC posted to the record a letter signed by 57 US Senators dated 15 May 2014. On 23 June 
2014, the same day as the deadline to submit rebuttal briefs, the DOC posted to the record a letter signed 
by 155 Members of the US House of Representatives dated 10 June 2014. These letters, as well as other 
letters from US lawmakers, local government leaders, and industry representatives and memoranda to 
                                                     
24 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.150. 
25 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.151. 
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the file describing phone calls and meetings with US lawmakers and industry representatives, revealed 
concerns regarding the DOC’s preliminary determination.26 
Korea argued that the DOC did not afford Korean respondents an opportunity to present evidence in 
defense of their interests under Article 6.2 because they had no notification from the DOC that the 
Tenaris financial statements submitted by U.S. Steel were properly on the record. In addition, the DOC 
failed to provide the Korean respondents with any opportunity to prepare presentations regarding such 
data, inconsistently with Article 6.4. Finally, the DOC’s decision to accept and rely on the Tenaris 
financial statements constitutes an “essential fact” which was not disclosed in sufficient time before the 
final determination, inconsistently with Article 6.9.  
The panel recognized that, “while Article 6.2 imposes a general duty on an investigating authority to 
ensure that interested parties have a full opportunity throughout an anti-dumping investigation for the 
defense of their interests, it does not give specific guidance on the type of procedural steps an 
investigating authority should take in ensuring the rights of interested parties.” The panel was not 
persuaded that because USDOC did not disclose its acceptance of the Tenaris financial statements on 
the record until the final determination, the Korean respondents were prevented from launching a ‘full-
scale argument.’  
The panel also explained that Article 6.4 requires an investigating authority to provide interested 
parties timely opportunities to see all non-confidential information that is relevant to the presentation of 
their cases and that is used by that authority in the anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare 
presentations on the basis of this information. The panel, however, ruled that nothing in Article 6.4 
suggest an investigating authority to ‘inform’ interested parties of procedural decisions to accept or use 
certain information in the anti-dumping investigation.  
Concerning Article 6.9, the panel observed that this provision does not require the investigating 
authority to disclose its decisions or conclusions, but rather require “disclosure of essential facts ‘under 
consideration’, which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures.”27 Since the 
essential facts which must be disclosed are ‘under consideration’ at the time of their disclosure, it implies 
that the investigating authority has not yet reached conclusions regarding its reliance on them at that 
stage. On the other hand, Article 6.9 requires an investigating authority to disclose only the essential 
facts but not its reasoning or its conclusions.  
Given the above reasoning, the panel ruled that the DOC’s reliance on the Tenaris profit data to 
calculate profit constitutes its “conclusion” to use that data in calculating CV profit. Thus it concluded 
that such reliance was not an essential fact within the meaning of Article 6.9, and the DOC was not 
required to disclose it. It elaborated that the acceptance of the Tenaris profit data on the record would 
not mean the DOC to necessarily consider that data as the basis for the CV profit determination. 
Acceptance on the record by an authority did not necessarily mean that the contents of that submission 
was considered “essential facts under consideration”. Even if the DOC had disclosed its acceptance of 
the Tenaris profit data on the record, that disclosure in itself would not have identified the Tenaris data 
as an "essential fact". 
Concerning the Korea’s allegations in connection with the letters and other communications, the 
panel ruled that they fell outside the terms of reference since they were entirely new claims, based on 
different facts and legal arguments. On these bases, the panel declined all the Korean claims concerning 
Article 6 of the AD Agreement.  
                                                     
26 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.202. 
27 US – OCTG, panel report, para.7.232. 
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3.5 Limited Examination of Respondents  
Korea claimed that the DOC acted inconsistently with Article 6.10 by limiting its examination to only 
two exporters, NEXTEEL and HYSCO, and by failing to individually examine the voluntary 
respondents, particularly Husteel, SeAH, and ILJIN. The DOC rebutted that there were a large number 
of exporters or producers involved in the underlying investigation. Moreover, the DOC maintained that 
it lacked the resources to examine all such exporters or producers, especially considering numerous 
concurrent anti-dumping proceedings conducted by the relevant office.  
It should be noted that the CIT remanded the DOC decision not to include ILJIN since welded 
OCTGs produced by NEXTEEL and HYSCO were not “representative” of seamless OCTGs.28  
Article 6.10 provides the authorities “shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for 
each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.” Only in cases where 
the number of exporters or producers is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, they 
may limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties. In addition, Article 
6.10.2 further provides, in cases where the authorities limit their examination, they shall nevertheless 
determine an individual margin of dumping for any exporter or producer not initially selected who 
submits the necessary information in time for that information to be considered during the course of the 
investigation. 
The panel explained that institutional resource constraints are equally valid as a basis for a limited 
examination under Article 6.10 as they are for not examining voluntary respondents under Article 6.10.2. 
Moreover, it ruled that an investigating authority has no obligation to provide a separate explanation of 
why it is practicable to examine only the selected number of exporters. The DOC’s conclusion of undue 
burden to individually examine the voluntary respondents was based on complexities unique to the 
underlying investigation, time constraints and resource constraints faced by the USDOC. The panel 
ruled that the DOC’s explanation of undue burden to individually examine the voluntary respondents 
was reasoned and adequate, and sufficient to satisfy its obligations under Article 6.10.2. Therefore, the 
panel declined Korea’s claim that DOC acted inconsistently with Article 6.10.2. 
In this ruling, the panel seemed to miss the key issue of the CIT remand decisions. It raised an 
interesting puzzle why the complainant did not appeal the panel ruling. In fact, the complainant decided 
not to bring an appeal due to the problem in the Appellate Body procedure that has caused a significant 
delay.29 The business communities wanted a quicker resolution of the situation, instead of being too 
much delayed due to the handicapped Appellate Body procedure. They thought that winning for CV 
profit issues was practically enough to rectify the situation. But their expectation turned out to be wrong 
when the DOC introduced the “particular market situation” method to raise the AD rates in the 
administrative review.  
4. Economic Analysis  
The economic shortcomings of AD regimes have been described at length. We therefore focus our 
analysis on the broader political-economic context in which the regime exists, rather than delving into 
the implications of particular measures supported by the panel. This seems particularly relevant given 
the unusual intrusions of politics into the case.  
4.1 Economic considerations at play  
We discuss three big issues:  
                                                     
28 US CIT (2015), 23. 
29 Based on the interview with the officials and business representatives who worked for the case.  
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A. We offer two distinct ways of thinking about anti-dumping. The choice ultimately determines 
whether one approaches this case in a narrow fashion – as offering new guidance on how countries 
should pursue anti-dumping cases – or in a broader political context.  
B. We argue that there is at least compelling circumstantial evidence that politics played a significant 
role in bringing about a highly-unusual outcome.  
C. The intrusion of politics into what was supposed to be an apolitical legal proceeding raises serious 
questions about implications for the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. We consider some of them.  
4.2 How should we think about the less than fair value determination?  
At one level, the US-OCTG (Korea) decision is the latest in a long line of jurisprudence that has helped 
to distinguish permissible from impermissible approaches to anti-dumping policy. At the core of the 
discussion has been the question of how countries may appropriately estimate less-than-fair-value 
(LTFV) margins. As those margins, when combined with affirmative injury determinations, lead directly 
to levels of protection, the debate can also be interpreted as asking what levels of protection are 
permissible under WTO rules? 
In the US-OCTG (Korea) decision, the debate over permissible approaches revolves around issues 
such as the determination of constructed value (CV) profits. The decision to include or exclude certain 
companies’ profits, as noted above, had a significant effect on the AD duties that the DOC ultimately 
put forward.  
If one abstracts from the specific questions at issue here – of which all but one were decided in favor 
of the United States – the tone is exceedingly familiar. It brings to mind the string of decisions on 
zeroing, for example. In such disputes, narrow interpretations of permissible behavior lead to smaller 
(or no) margins and duties, while permissive interpretations lead to larger margins and duties.  
On what basis can a panel decide whether the narrow or permissive interpretation is more 
appropriate? Of course, if there is plain language in the AD agreement that explicitly addresses the 
question at hand, then the decision is easy. But what of the more common case where it is necessary to 
infer meaning from language that seems related to the question at hand, but vague? Or what principles 
should guide if there are clauses that appear in conflict?  
This question has been central to a critique of the WTO DSM that now seems to threaten the system 
itself. In the context of a different DSM decision – a softwood lumber case that approved of a U.S. 
zeroing approach – USTR Robert Lighthizer made clear his sentiments about the entire line of 
jurisprudence: 
“The WTO rules do not prohibit ‘zeroing’…The United States never agreed to any such rule in the 
WTO negotiations, and never would. WTO Appellate Body reports to the contrary are wrong, and 
reflect overreaching by that body. The United States commends this panel for … having the courage 
to stand up to the undue pressure that the Appellate Body has been putting on panels for many 
years.” 
This official commentary on a separate case is invoked only to help justify the following meta-approach 
that we offer as a way to think about these cases in general. We suggest that there are two distinct ways 
of thinking about the proper approach to LTFV determination: 
1. The “Best Estimator” approach (BE); 
2. The “Bound Protection” approach (BP).  
The BE approach should be familiar to any student of econometrics. When trying to estimate a variable 
Y with an estimator Ŷ , we can consider various properties of the estimator, such as whether it is biased, 
or the narrowness of the confidence interval it will generate. In this vein, we can think of Y as the LTFV 
margin. We imagine there is a “true” value of the LTFV margin that corresponds to the intent of the AD 
agreement. If the text of the agreement were sufficiently detailed – a complete contract – we could 
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simply follow the directions for each configuration of facts. For example, what does one do if a key 
profit estimation for a constructed value stems only from a University of Iowa student paper? Does one 
include it or not?  
Of course, the AD agreement represents an incomplete contract and has nothing like that sort of 
detail. So instead we look for clues as to which Ŷ is likely to deviate least from the true Y that the parties 
to the agreement would have specified, if only they had delved deeply enough. As guides to discovering 
this BE, we look at related language in the agreement and subsequent interpretations of that language. 
These are all attempts to minimize error in our search for the true value of Y.  
The BP approach, in contrast, does not presume that there exists a true value of Y. This, in turn, 
pretty much kills the idea of a BE Ŷ . If the AD agreement did not offer specifics on particular estimation 
methodologies, it was not because the contracting parties were being coy, or did not have time to spell 
out all their thinking on the matter. Instead, it could be that there was no agreement on such matters. 
Instead, the specified elements of the agreement were meant to produce a general correspondence 




 represents the highest 
permissible level of protection that corresponds to the instance (which generally describes industry 
conditions at a given time). This corresponds to the much more straightforward idea of a tariff binding 
that one conventionally finds in market access agreements.  
These two approaches can lead to tensions when they coexist. Someone subscribing to the first 
approach could “interpret” the AD agreement to require use of available data, for example, because that 
use will lead to a more precise estimate. Someone subscribing to the second approach could object, 
saying that if the AD agreement did not explicitly require the use of such data, then this new additional 
restriction unjustifiably limits the extent of protection the United States was allowed under the AD 
agreement.  
In the BP approach, for example, there is a general sense that a particular history of performance 
(prices, capacity utilization, profits, imports) in one part of the U.S. steel industry should allow a certain 
level of tariff protection, Y . The DOC is free to adjust its procedures to get the highest ¢Y  it can 
construct, so long as ¢Y £Y .  
In the BE approach, the DOC can only adopt sanctioned estimation procedures, of the sort that 
presumably lead to tight, unbiased estimates of the true Y. It matters far less what the ultimate level of 
protection might be, so long as the procedures were deemed legitimate.  
One obvious appeal of the BE approach over the BP approach is that it has the consistency and 
predictability that we expect in legal procedures. As interpretations accumulate over time, the range of 
acceptable estimators diminishes and there is a tighter correspondence between observed facts and the 
ultimate LTFV estimate. In contrast, under the BP approach, there is the fundamental difficulty that the 
underlying correspondence between observables and bound protection is, at best, implicit in the 
agreement. Without textual guidance, the limits of permissibility may shift over time and may reflect 
the relative power of the two parties to the dispute. 
This description of the two approaches is certainly not offered as a normative endorsement of the BP 
approach. There are strong economic and legal reasons to prefer a more predictable approach that is 
relatively immune to external influence. Instead, the BP approach is presented as a means of 
interpretation for a stance that has come to play an important role and may serve as a better positive 
description.  
When applied to the US-OCTG (Korea) case at hand, the BP idea may help explain some of the 
particular oddities of the U.S. approach, in which there was a negative preliminary determination, then 
an active lobbying campaign, then the reversal of the decision in the final determination.  
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4.3 The behavioral oddities surrounding this case and potential interpretations  
An unconventional interpretation of a case is only merited if unconventional behavior was observed. In 
the case of US-OCTG (Korea), it was. Two unusual developments stand out. First, there was the rarity 
of seeing a negative LTFV preliminary determination followed by a positive final determination. As 
noted above, this was observed in fewer than 1 percent of cases preceding the current one. Second, there 
was the oddity of a panel decision in which the Korean government lost on all but one major point, yet 
the government declined to appeal. For each oddity, there seems to be at least circumstantial evidence 
of political influence at play.  
In the wake of the preliminary LTFV determination, there was a notable lobbying campaign.30 As 
far as the lack of appeal is concerned, it is worth noting the broader political context surrounding the 
US-Korean relationship. That relationship had already seen political pressure trump legal guarantees 
when the United States threatened withdrawal from the KORUS free trade agreement unless the 
Republic of Korea agreed to renegotiate it. This renegotiation process commenced in July 2017 and was 
signed in September 2018. It thus straddled the November 2017 release of the Panel report in US-OCTG 
(Korea).  
None of this is to suggest that the panel itself was subject to political influence, only that the unusual 
behavior surrounding the case and the interpretation of its significance are hard to understand without 
the broader political context.  
4.4 The implications of a more political dispute settlement mechanism  
Perhaps the central virtue of any dispute settlement mechanism is its objectivity. It is so fundamental 
that its importance usually requires no discussion. The attempt at dispassionate justice is the entire 
reason that so much effort is spent basing decisions on close textual analysis or established precedent.  
It would be naïve to pretend, however, that the global trading system has been immune from political 
pressures. In the early days of the GATT, the European Coal and Steel Community hardly seemed to 
meet the requirements of Article XXIV, yet the political demands of the day – and the strong sentiments 
of Contracting Parties – dictated its acceptance. Also, in the 1950s, when the U.S. Congress applied 
import quotas on agricultural products, it received a waiver for the measures, which otherwise seemed 
to contravene GATT prohibitions.31 Then there were sensitive political issues that contracting parties 
decided were best addressed outside of the dispute settlement mechanism, such as issues surrounding 
large passenger aircraft, at least for a time. The ability to adapt to political exigencies helped the system 
survive.  
But there is a qualitative difference between crafting a system so as to accommodate political 
concerns and seeing influence exerted in the midst of a dispute. It is the difference between ex ante and 
ex post reinterpretation of the rules.  
To place such a shift in context, there is one further contrast to be drawn, between ex post 
reinterpretation and ex post renegotiation. The latter has been a longstanding de facto feature of the 
dispute settlement system. It occurs whenever retaliation is invoked in a dispute – the reciprocal 
withdrawal of concessions effectively functions as a renegotiation.  
                                                     
30 See Section 3.4 above.  
31 Porter and Bowman (1989), p. 5. 
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The granting of the agriculture waiver, as an example, represented an agreement between countries 
about what the rules should be. It was worked out over a period of years.32 Instances of retaliation as a 
dispute outcome are one known, potential outcome of an agreement.  
The exertion of influence in the midst of a dispute is a more serious matter. It is difficult to predict 
and calls into question the meaning of agreements themselves. Herein lie the two principle costs, should 
political influence become an important determinant of dispute outcomes. They are tightly related. The 
first cost is the loss of predictability in the system. The second cost is the loss of faith in the system. 
Predictability is important to economic actors, who must make investment and resource allocation 
decisions based on expectations. There is recent empirical work explicitly demonstrating the cost of 
uncertainty in the trading system.33 To describe the effects accurately, though, this may be a useful 
moment, however, to recall the classic distinction between risk and uncertainty.34 In the formulation of 
Frank Knight, risk occurred when outcomes are uncertain, but the uncertainty is quantifiable. In the 
context of dispute settlement, this might be, for example, when there is an 80 percent chance the 
complaining country wins a dispute, and then, upon the complaining country winning, a 50-50 chance 
that the losing country chooses to maintain its practices and accept retaliation. In such a case, companies 
and consumers do not know what outcome will prevail, but they can place odds on the possible 
outcomes. The alternative, in Knight’s approach, is uncertainty. This obtains when it is not possible to 
assign probabilities to the possible outcomes. By moving into a world of aberrant, politically-driven 
interference with dispute settlement cases, potential outcomes become much more difficult to quantify 
and it becomes much more difficult for economic agents to plan. This undermines a major benefit of the 
rules-based trading system.  
The second, closely-correlated cost could be a loss of faith in the trading system. In the absence of a 
rules-based trading system, the presumed default system is a “law of the jungle,” in which countries 
exercise what political power and threats they can. This need not mean a reversion to Nash or prohibitive 
tariffs; threats can work to sustain lower tariff levels.35 But it would likely mean discarding some of the 
key features of the WTO system, such as MFN barriers and the additional conformity to rules that comes 
through a general desire to be in good standing within the system. This scenario – trade’s version of an 
apocalyptic outcome – becomes significantly more likely if dispute settlement outcomes are seen as 
subject to political influence. If that is the case, then the practical distinction between a rules-based 
system and “law of the jungle” diminishes. That means, in turn, that there is a diminishing incentive to 
work to support the rules-based system.  
To conclude the point, it is worth noting that political influence on dispute settlement outcomes is 
neither binary, nor novel, nor evidence of corruption. Countries can agree to settle on certain issues 
while conforming to prior understandings – or accepting panel interpretations – on others. There have 
certainly been past instances in which the threat of international relations repercussions affected 
countries’ behavior in trade disputes. And the influence we are describing concerns moves such as 
curious failures to challenge panel rulings, rather than pressure on panelists or, in other cases, appelate 
body members.  
Nonetheless, the behavior in US-OCTG does seem to herald a concerning move away from the 
predictable application of trade rules.  
                                                     
32 The U.S. Congress had begun pushing on the agricultural restrictions in 1948. The U.S. provisions became effective in 
1953. The United States applied for and received a waiver in 1955.  
33 See the work of Handley and Limao (2017).  
34 Dizikes (2010).  
35 Bagwell and Staiger (1990). 
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5. Conclusion 
As a straight legal case, US-OCTG marked a broad victory for the United States over the Republic of 
Korea. Though Korea had complained about a broad range of U.S. behaviors in the way it calculated its 
antidumping duties, the Panel found in Korea’s favor only on the issue of objectionable U.S. constructed 
value calculations. In the other areas, the Panel seemed to follow the general reasoning that antidumping 
practices could be economically dubious but still permissible, so long as they were not explicitly 
prohibited by the Antidumping Agreement.  
The more remarkable elements of the case were to be found in unusual behavior surrounding it. There 
was the rare instance of a negative preliminary determination being reversed by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce in its final decision. There were blatant political interventions. There was the oddity of Korea 
declining to appeal such an adverse panel report and granting the United States a long implementation 
period.  
The evidence of politics infiltrating the dispute settlement process is entirely circumstantial, but the 
dispute came amidst a time of tense diplomatic dealings between the United States and Korea, 
particularly with the threatened elimination and subsequent renegotiation of the trade deal between them 
(KORUS). While the GATT and WTO systems have never been immune from international politics, 
this case seems to denote a heightened level of susceptibility to pressure. To some extent, the global 
trading system’s ability to accommodate shifting political pressures is one of its strengths. Beyond a 
certain point, however, the introduction of political pressures into dispute settlement can introduce a 
new and damaging type of uncertainty into the system. The US-OCTG case can serve to illustrate this 
threat, as it ended up effectively validating AD behaviors that might have seemed open to challenge.  
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